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Abstract 
This paper examines the joint production of golf and real estate 
development. The empirical results of this analysis show that, over time, 
golf courses are being constructed less for recreational golf and more for 
contractual assurance of green open space for homes. We believe that this 
fundamentally provides some evidence that the demand for environmental 
quality is growing and that markets are increasingly able to find creative 
contracting mechanisms to satisfy demands for public goods. 
 
JEL Codes: H49, Q56, R31 
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I. Introduction 
As people and economies grow richer, they demand enhanced 
environmental quality. At least that seems to be one of the non-
controversial conclusions that can be reached from economic analysis 
of environmental Kuznets curves (Yandle et al., 2004). Green space 
initiatives are increasingly common on the political landscape, and the 
issue is full of economics, politics, emotion, and opinion. Therefore, 
we start from the position that there is some fledgling demand for 
people to sequester or otherwise prevent the development of certain 
areas, particularly those near housing. These areas are being 
                                                
* This research was funded, in part, by grants from the Property and Environment 
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preserved as open, pasture, wooded, prairie, or raw land and not 
converted into commercial or residential development. We propose 
that homes on golf courses may be an entrepreneurial attempt at 
supplying the joint provision of golf courses along with housing on 
desirable green spaces. 
It is fair to say that economic analysts, pundits, and lay people 
have long argued that the private, free market may regularly fail to 
provide public goods such as green space, open space, parks, and 
similar environmental amenities owing to the public goods and free 
rider problem. While that may very well be true, we think a second 
look may reveal that the growing demand for these environmental 
assets may be met in unusual ways by private, profit-oriented 
entrepreneurs. 
We believe that there is a significant, private, demand for 
environmental amenities that grows as people become wealthier. 
Hence we study how markets and contract solutions might come to 
meet this demand. We do this in two seemingly separate but actually 
similar contexts: the demand for open, green space and the demand 
for golf. One important caveat is in order. We do not intend to argue 
or present evidence that the socially optimal level of collective goods 
is created or produced by private demanders, but rather, that markets 
are not barren when it comes to the provision of these public goods. 
This is not a normative analysis. 
This paper explores whether golf courses may be substitutes for 
natural open green space in the eyes of some consumers and to some 
extent satisfy their demands for environmental quality. Simply, are 
golf courses today being constructed, in part, not only for people to 
play golf, but also to provide open green space to adjacent home 
owners? We remain agnostic on, and it is not the point of our paper, 
whether golf courses are superior to alternative forms of green 
spacing such as conservation easements, deed covenants, taxation 
and regulation, or similar devices.  
We start from the following factual basis. Golf course 
construction proceeds at an unusually high rate given the growth in 
the number of people playing golf or the amount of golf being 
played. In 2000, an estimated 56,000 new homes on golf courses were 
constructed at a total cost of $8.4 billion, and they make up 
approximately 4 percent of the total 1.5 million homes constructed in 
the United States (Golf 20/20, 2003). In fact, the golf industry 
laments with some ever-increasing agony the continuing construction 
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of courses with no concomitant apparent increase in the demand for 
golf: 
 
Hit with a shot of bad weather and a surge in the 
construction of new courses, many golf course owners across 
Wisconsin are struggling to stay below par. “We are definitely 
saturated in terms of courses,” said Terianne Petzold, 
executive director of the Golf Course Owners of Wisconsin, 
a Milwaukee-based industry group. “We're at the point where 
we're getting pretty close to full immersion. It would be nice 
to figure out a way to get people to stop building.” (Brooks, 
2004) 
 
Rounds are down, player development is flat, new course 
openings are half of what they were a few years ago and more 
courses than ever have “For Sale” signs out front because of 
overbuilding, overfinancing and over-the-top wishful thinking 
by dot-com millionaire developers. (Jones, 2003) 
 
The golf course industry seems to implicitly recognize the main 
point of our inquiry: 
 
The percentage of real-estate oriented courses, where 
profitability issues can be offset by the increase in land values, 
will continue to increase, and courses driven by real estate will 
be more than half of the new courses added within a year or 
two. (Golf 20/20, 2003, p.18) 
 
This paper is designed to align three branches of economic 
inquiry into sports economics and environmental issues. One, can 
and do golf course designers and builders internalize the impact that 
their construction techniques have on neighboring real estate? Two, 
is it appropriate to challenge the assertion that private and free 
markets always underproduce public goods? Three, is the demand for 
open and green space real, and can it be quantified? 
 
II. The Recapitalization Hypothesis 
One way that real estate developers can capture the joint demand 
of golf and green space is by constructing homes on golf courses and 
charging price premiums for contractual assurance that the green 
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space will persist. A New York Times article (Harden, 2001) indicates 
that golf course construction continues to rise while growth in the 
number of golfers has slowed. It states that many golf developers 
enter projects knowing they will lose money in the golf operation but 
make up the difference by charging price premiums at the real estate 
office. Moreover, many golf developers sell their courses to 
management companies once home sites are sold. Casual empiricism 
suggests that many people living in golf course communities do not 
play golf but simply demand the open space, and that the fraction of 
people buying homes on courses who actually play golf is declining. 
In this paper, we investigate, cross-sectionally, the factors that play a 
role in golf courses as surrogate green spaces. We also examine data 
on golf course sales that capture the recent phenomena of golf club 
reevaluations.  
We develop what we will call the recapitalization hypothesis. This 
idea says: 
  
1. There is an increasing demand for green space adjacent to 
homes, and golf courses are surrogate green space. 
2. Golf courses provide long-run assurance that green space will 
persist. 
3. Golf courses then add value to adjacent real estate by virtue 
of their persistent green, open space provision. 
4. Golf course entrepreneurs will tap this demand for green 
open space and construct golf courses. 
5. These new golf courses will appear to be constructed out of 
hubris. That is, they will cost more than the resulting cash 
flows will reveal. 
6. Land values will capitalize the value of the adjacent green 
open space because the new home buyers demand the open 
green space and will pay resulting price premiums. 
7. The golf course builder, the land developer, will capture the 
overcharges on the cost of golf course construction in the 
added value to the adjacent real estate. 
8. Because the golf course builder is actually a real estate 
developer, he will subsequently liquidate the golf course at 
some fraction of its cost to an expert at managing and 
running golf courses who can make a normal return on the 
operation of the golf course because the initial capital outlay 
for him is now lower than the original construction costs. 
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9. The new buyer will be contractually obligated to maintain the 
open green space into the foreseeable future.  
 
We subject this recapitalization, environmental quality hypothesis 
to testing using a comprehensive golf course database. In short, the 
goal of this analysis is to examine the contractual assurance (in the 
spirit of Klein and Leffler, 1981) that golf developers provide to 
homeowners that demand green space and to provide evidence of a 
Coasian (1960) solution in the joint production of golf courses and 
real estate developments. Supposing that we find these assurances, 
we will summarize these results in the framework of a market-based 
solution to the demand for green space, not a demand that goes 
unquenched in need of collective action. Assuming we find these 
assurances, we will offer alternative explanations of the political 
phenomenon we observe around us, the publicly funded green space 
initiative. Lacking these assurances, we will ponder why the market 
has failed to deliver that which homeowners desire and why 
collective action is deemed appropriate. We expect that we may find a 
mixed bag, locationally based, which may be enlightening as to why 
some market locales are better than others at providing the desired 
green space, the growing places, as opposed to the stable places 
where few new homes are under construction. 
 
III. Related Literature  
The Coase Theorem (1960) is typically applied to what has 
traditionally been defined as negative externalities where one firm’s 
costs are a positive function of another’s output. The implications of 
this model are that, in the case of what is usually called a positive 
externality, Firm 1 will take into account its positive impact on Firm 
2's profits and thus its output will be higher than that under isolated 
behavior.  
There exists a copious amount of empirical literature that 
examines how assets without prices are sometimes captured, 
internalized, and accounted for in prices and contracts. Cheung’s 
(1973) classic paper on “The Fable of the Bees” responds to earlier 
assertions set forth by Meade (1952) and Bator (1958) about where 
apple farming and beekeeping occur next to each other. The apples 
provide food for the bees, and the bees fertilize the apple crops, 
creating increased value for neighbors without compensation on both 
accounts. In Cheung’s analysis of bee services and nectar in 
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Washington, he provides some suggestion of a Coasian solution and 
shows that farmers and beekeepers do indeed contract with each 
other, and the market rental prices of hives reflect what look to be 
unpriced values of pollination. More recently, Muth et al. (2003) 
provide further evidence that the market for beekeeper services is 
well developed and that the unpriced, so-called external benefits of 
pollination to many agricultural crops are not so external or unpriced. 
They show, using times-series data on pollination fees, that 
exogenous shocks to beekeeper costs (specifically, Varroa mite 
infestations) positively influence pollination fees. 
There are several papers that study how unpriced assets or 
outputs affect store rent at shopping malls. Brueckner (1993) 
develops a theoretical model in which a particular store’s revenue is a 
function of its total floor space and the space of nearby stores. The 
developer allocates space to stores so that net marginal revenue 
(which accounts for what are usually called the external effects of 
increasing each store’s space on rents paid by other stores) is equal to 
the marginal cost of space. Brueckner’s theory states that if two 
stores have the same rent elasticity of demand, the store that 
generates the greater positive overall impact will pay a lower land 
rent. Thus, large anchor stores that attract consumers to nearby 
specialty shops are offered land rent subsidies to produce at a larger 
quantity than they otherwise would in an isolated location with no 
spillover effects. Pashigian and Gould (1998) use 1992 operating data 
for mall stores to examine contractual arrangements between mall 
developers and anchor stores. They show that the per-square-foot 
rent paid by anchor stores in super-regional malls is 90 percent less 
than the median per-square-foot rent paid by clothing stores and up 
to 95 percent less than rents paid by food, shoe, and jewelry stores.  
There is research on the impacts of unpriced assets on home 
prices. Li and Brown (1980), for example, examine micro-
neighborhood effects on housing prices. They examine aesthetic 
attributes of neighborhoods, pollution levels, and proximity of homes 
to local amenities such as schools, industry, parks, and bodies of 
water. They use data from a sample of 781 single-family home sales 
in the Boston, Massachusetts, area. They specify a linear hedonic 
model of home prices regressed on home structure characteristics 
(such as number of bedrooms, age of structure, lot size), 
demographic attributes (such as density, per capita income), property 
tax paid, and the micro-neighborhood location or unpriced asset 
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variables. One of the micro-neighborhood variables is an on-site 
visual index that measures homeowners’ ranking of visual quality and 
views from the house. The authors estimate the model with and 
without the neighborhood variables. Most of the coefficients for 
these unpriced attributes have the expected signs. For example, an 
increase in noise level reduces home prices, and the visual quality 
index has a positive impact. The results of the models also indicate 
that structural attribute coefficients in the hedonic equation are 
affected very little by the introduction of the location variables in the 
model, an unsurprising result considering that construction costs are 
typically independent of these attributes. Some differences, however, 
do exist between the two models, especially for demographic 
characteristics. When the unpriced assets are introduced, the 
coefficient for median income is reduced to a non-significant value. 
Also, the coefficients for residential density and high school dropouts 
have either the wrong sign or are insignificant until the micro-
neighborhood variables are included. 
Do and Grudnitski (1995) were the first to empirically estimate 
the impact that unpriced golf course assets have on the prices of 
adjacent single-family homes. Using data on 717 residential sales in 
the San Diego area, they use a hedonic pricing model with a dummy 
variable for properties that abut golf courses and other controls such 
as age, square footage, number of bedrooms, etc. In their sample, 
they employ a matched-pair design to ensure that price premiums for 
golf properties are not driven by other location-specific variables or 
by systematic differences in the physical characteristics of the houses. 
The matched-pair technique in their study is implemented by 
including in the sample at least one property in the same vicinity (but 
not on the golf course) for every golf course property. Do and 
Grudnitski estimate that the price premium paid for homes on golf 
courses is approximately 7.6 percent.  
Our hypothesis that homes on golf courses are contractual 
assurance of open green space is akin to Foldvary’s (1994) view of 
territorial collective goods. Foldvary would argue that in our case, the 
value of the environmental amenities of these homes on golf 
courses—green open space or scenic water and woody views—is 
capitalized into the land values of the home sites. Foldvary goes on to 
promote the use of site rents or user fees as a stream of revenue to 
fund these environmental amenities. We, however, argue that the 
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prices of these home sites already incorporate the increased value 
from the environmental amenities. 
Another underlying theme at the root of this analysis is the 
concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Kuznets (1955) 
originally suggested that as real income per capita increases, income 
inequality increases as well, but then decreases after some turning 
point. Thus, as economies grow, income equality follows a U-shape 
relationship. There have been other related analyses since Kuznets 
that have shown long-term relations between capitalism and 
economic equality (Berggren, 1999).  
The environmental applications of Kuznets's proposition started 
with Grossman and Krueger’s (1995) study of environmental quality 
across different countries over several years. Using panel data from 
the Global Environmental Monitoring System tracking of urban air 
quality in both developed and undeveloped countries, they examined 
the relationship between GDP per capita and several measures of 
environmental quality. For example, sulfur dioxide, smoke, and heavy 
particles are each used as proxies for urban air pollution. Their results 
provide strong evidence that increases in GDP are associated with 
environmental decay for very poor countries. They find that the 
critical turning point occurred at incomes per capita of less than 
$8,000 (in 1985 dollars). 
 
IV. Data and Empirical Framework 
We have obtained a large golf course database from Sportometrics1 
that has already been used in other economics and environmental 
work (Limehouse et al., 2010). This database consists of more than 
125 golf course characteristics for approximately 15,000 golf courses 
in the United States and Canada. To this we have added local and 
demographic information, plus some environmental information 
(such as Sierra Club membership), which gives us a large and 
powerful starting point for economic analysis of the basic and 
underlying questions posed in this analysis. 
In addition, we have obtained data from Golf, Inc. Magazine2 on 
golf course sales from January 2000 to December 2002. This database 
                                                
1 Sportometrics is a golf course consulting company that licensed its data to us for this 
project. 
2 Golf, Inc. Magazine is a publication for golf course owners, developers, and 
managers. 
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lists all courses in the United States that were sold during that time 
period, and for most of these courses, the following information is 
also provided: (i) the sale price, (ii) whether or not the seller was in 
default, (iii) whether the sale was part of the sellers’ liquidation of 
non-strategic assets, and (iv) if the buyer plans to develop (or 
continue to develop) surrounding land adjacent to the course.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for selected numeric variables 
in our databases for golf courses meeting the following 
characteristics: 
 
1. All golf course sales from January 2000 to December 2002. 
2. Golf course sales for which there is mention in the sales 
report that the seller was bankrupt or in default with the 
lending agent providing financial capital for the golf course 
construction or operation. 
3. Sales for which there is mention that the seller sold the 
course as part of its liquidation of non-strategic assets. (It 
should be noted that the courses in this category are mutually 
exclusive from the courses in #2 above.) Sales for which the 
buyer plans to develop surrounding land into home sites.  
4. All courses in the Limehouse et al. (2010) database. 
 
Courses that were sold between December 2000 and January 
2002 are, on average, newer courses. The average age of courses 
listed in the sales report is 19 years old, compared to an overall 
average of 37 years for all courses. In addition, transactions in which 
the seller was in default involve even newer courses (14 years) and 
have a smaller standard deviation than all course sales. Total golf fees 
(greens plus cart fees per 18 holes) are generally more expensive on 
the sold golf courses. However, for sales involving liquidation of 
non-strategic assets, the golf fees are, on average, less than those for 
all sales and for all golf courses.  
Table 2 gives other course characteristics for course sales and for 
all courses in our sample. The proportion of sales involving courses 
with homes is significantly larger than all courses (73.1 percent versus 
41.5 percent). In addition, a larger proportion of course sales is 
located in golf communities. There appears to be no pattern in the 
data concerning course classifications (public, private, etc.) of course 
sales. However, a larger proportion of semi-private courses was sold 
during the time period. 
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To better analyze the sale prices of courses sold during the 
relevant time period, consider the following calculation to estimate 
the capitalized (present value) value of each course:  
 
PVj =
Feesj ×Roundsj( )−Expensesj
i =
Cashflowsj
i  
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Golf ,  Inc .  Sales Data 
Variable Obs Min Max Mean SD 
All sales from Jan. 00 to  Dec. 01, n = 127 courses  
Sale Price ($) 101 467,500 77,500,000 8,134,079 13,864,200 
Course Age 122 1 82 19 14 
Total Golf Fee1 117 18 175 64 34 
Rounds Per Day 86 44 191 108 31 
Sales in which seller was in default, n = 15 courses 
Sale Price 14 600,000 20,000,000 3,810,714 5,561,120 
Course Age 15 3 31 14 11 
Total Golf Fee 12 25 117 52 22 
Rounds Per Day 10 60 110 85 17 
Sales involving liquidation of non-strategic assets, n = 14 courses 
Sale Price 11 1,500,000 6,000,000 2,615,000 1,331,413 
Course Age 14 11 39 28 8 
Total Golf Fee 14 18 64 40 14 
Rounds Per Day 9 44 164 100 43 
Sales in which buyer will develop surrounding land, n = 18 courses 
Sale Price 14 467,500 20,000,000 5,119,821 5,508,983 
Course Age 18 1 40 14 12 
Total Golf Fee 17 43 130 63 24 
Rounds Per Day 12 55 137 99 23 
All golf courses in the Sportometrics database, n = 15,051 courses 
Sale Price n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Course Age 15,051 0 124 37 27 
Total Golf Fee 15,051 3 375 51 30 
Rounds Per Day 9,787 7 464 105 48 
1 Calculated as greens fee plus cart fee per 18 holes. 
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where PV is the present or capitalized value of course j, Fees is the 
greens fees for each course, Rounds is the number of annual rounds 
played on the course, Expenses is the operating maintenance expenses 
for the course, and i is the discount rate, assumed to be 8 percent. 
Adjustments to the discount rate have little or no impact on the 
empirical results.  
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Golf Course Sales 
 
Course Sales 
 Course Characteristic (Jan 00–Dec 02)1 All Courses2 
Homes on Course 87 (73.1%) 6,250 (41.5%) 
Located in Golf Community 48 (40.3%) 2,728 (18.1%) 
Public Course 41 (34.5%) 6,919 (46.0%) 
Private Course 28 (23.5%) 3,826 (25.4%) 
Semi-Private Course 40 (33.6%) 3,236 (21.5%) 
Resort Course 10 (8.4%) 910 (6.05%) 
1 127 golf course sales from the Golf, Inc. sales report. 
2 15,051 golf courses from the Sportometrics database. 
Note:  Percentages of total courses within each category are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
The majority of courses in our database do not provide operating 
expenses. For these courses, we estimate cash flows by assuming that 
operating expenses are 35 percent of total revenue—the median ratio 
of operating expenses to revenues for courses that provide expense 
data. Although this may not correctly estimate cash flows for some or 
many of the courses, it does allow for an adequate measure for 
analyzing the relationship between the variation in golf course 
revenues and the sale price of courses. It should be noted that 
membership fees make up a substantial proportion of revenues for 
private and semi-private courses. Unfortunately, we do not have 
adequate data on membership fees to include them in this analysis. It 
is, however, ambiguous as to whether the above calculation over- or 
underestimates revenues for courses with memberships. Although we 
are not including membership fees in the calculation, greens fees are 
typically paid only by guests on courses and are not market driven as 
in public courses. To accurately calculate course revenue, the data 
would have to report the number of rounds played by members and 
the number played by guests. This issue is addressed and corrected 
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for, in part, by including dummy variables for private and semi-
private courses in any models in which revenues and greens fees are 
analyzed.  
Golf courses can be appraised very differently for property tax 
purposes, and the tax millage that is assessed can differ substantially 
from year to year, causing the property tax liability for golf courses to 
be quite different across states and even across time for the same golf 
course. We are unable to control for these differences in property 
taxes. We acknowledge that differences in property taxes are more 
important in the tax treatment between private (for-profit) versus 
public (tax-exempt or municipal-owned) courses, and we include 
dummy variables to control for these differences.   
Although it has been suggested to us that the cost of water may 
be important to our analysis, we are of the opinion that because many 
U.S. golf courses do not pay to use water, but instead use surface 
water or well water, that this factor is not critical. We acknowledge 
that surface or well water has value in terms of opportunity cost, but 
because the correlation between these and municipal water varies so 
dramatically across the land, we take the position that water cost 
differences do not materially impact our results. According to 
Throssell et al. (2009, Table 10), only 14 percent of U.S. golf courses 
use municipal water as a source for irrigation. Furthermore, we 
believe that any differences in property tax rates, water prices, and 
other operating costs would be reflected in the capitalized value we 
calculated. Generally, golf courses that face higher property tax rates, 
water prices, or other operating costs would presumably pass along 
these costs to their customers and charge higher prices for their 
services. These higher prices would result in a higher present value of 
cash flows.   
 
V. Results 
1. Golf Course Recapitalization 
Table 3 presents model results of course sale prices regressed on 
capitalized course value, course yardage, course age, and dummy 
variables for the following characteristics: 1) homes on the course, 2) 
golf community, 3) seller in default, 4) non-strategic asset sale, 5) 
buyer to develop surrounding land, and 6) course type for private, 
public, and semi-private courses (resort courses serve as the excluded 
group). As expected, the capitalized value coefficient is positive and 
highly significant but is not statistically equal to one, indicating that 
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factors other than expected cash flows explain some of the variation 
in sale prices. The coefficients for public, private, and semi-private 
courses show that resort courses are sold at higher prices, indicating 
that other revenue-generating amenities may be included in these 
transactions. Insignificant coefficients in the regression are golf 
community, seller in default (both of these are marginally significant), 
buyer to develop surrounding land, and course age. The coefficient 
for homes on the course is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level, indicating a $7.6 million premium for golf courses with 
residential development on site. While the buyer to develop 
surrounding land variable attempts to capture some of this effect, the 
homes on course variable indicates that these courses are sold at a 
premium. On the other hand, courses sold as part of the seller’s 
liquidation of non-strategic assets are sold at an average discount of 
$9.4  million.  In  the  sales  data, all  courses  that  were  sold  in  this  
 
Table 3: Golf Course Sales: OLS  
Dependent Variable: Sale Price 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 Intercept 60,854,316 (22,797,753) *** 
Capitalized Value 0.47 (0.10) *** 
Homes on the Course 7,577,273 (3,374,439) ** 
Golf Community -4,525,501 (2,711,579) 
 Seller in Default -5,218,685 (3,306,425) 
 Non-strategic Asset Sale -9,441,105 (4,248,701) ** 
Buyer to Develop -1,848,272 (3,037,713) 
 Course Yardage -18,757 (10,120) * 
Course Yardage Squared 1.94 (1.03) * 
Course Age -569,261 (552,400) 
 Course Age Squared 19,579 (11,967) 
 Public Course -23,490,234 (4,142,390) *** 
Private Course -23,650,519 (4,654,482) *** 
Semi-private Course -28,402,542 (3,984,079) *** 
R-squared 0.81 
  Observations 68     
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value < 0.10. 
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category had homes. This may provide evidence for the notion that 
once course developers sell housing lots, the golf operation is sold to 
management companies at a discount. The summation of the homes 
on course and non-strategic asset coefficients ($1.8 million) is an 
estimate of the net discount for courses sold with homes. Due to the 
large standard errors of both coefficients, the hypothesis that the sum 
of these coefficients is equal to zero cannot be rejected. 
 
2. Other Data Considerations 
Our database provides course characteristics that may be factors 
in golf courses as surrogate green spaces. As environmental demand 
increases and as population and crowding grow, a new market 
potential has emerged to use golf courses as wildlife refuges and 
green space to complement land development. As a proxy to identify 
courses that operate, in part, to meet an environmental demand for 
open space, we consider golf clubs that have homes adjacent to the 
course. These homes are not necessarily part of golf communities 
developed specifically for home sites. At some point, however, it 
would seem that some creative contracting and environmental 
entrepreneurship captured part of the demand for open space by 
building homes on courses. The data indicate that the average age of 
courses with homes is statistically less than the average age of courses 
without homes.  
The binary logit model reported in Table 4 estimates the 
determinants of whether courses have homes. The explanatory 
variables are 1) course age, 2) course classification (private, public, 
etc.), 3) the proportion of the county population that are members of 
the Sierra Club, 4) county population per square mile, 5) county 
housing units per square mile, 6) year 2000 per capita personal 
income in the county where the course is located, 7) the level of real 
GDP per capita (in year 2000 dollars) at the time the course was 
constructed, and 8) whether the course is environmentally certified 
by Audubon International.  
The coefficient on course age is negative and highly significant, 
indicating that newer courses are more likely to have homes on the 
course, providing some indirect evidence that we are on the 
downward sloping portion on an Environmental Kuznets Curve and 
that the demand for environmental quality rises once the income 
threshold is reached. 
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Table 4: Homes on Golf Courses: Binary Logit 
Dependent Variable: [1 = Homes on Course; 0 = No Homes on 
Course] 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
  Intercept 1.127 (0.247) *** 
Course Age -0.018 (0.003) *** 
Proportion Sierra Club 53.969 (9.627) *** 
Public Course -1.55 (0.079) *** 
Private Course 0.115 (0.084) 
  Military Course -3.014 (0.337) *** 
Semi-private Course -0.437 (0.082) *** 
Population Per Square Mile -0.0006 (0.00015) *** 
Housing Units Per Square Mile 0.001 (0.00037) *** 
Aububon Certified Golf Course 0.063 (0.072) 
  Per Capita Personal Income -0.00002 (0.000003) *** 
Initial Real GDP Per Capita 0.00001 (0.000006) ** 
 Observations 15,045     
 *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, and * p-value < 0.10. 
 
The proportion of county population that are members of the 
Sierra Club is included to proxy for environmental sensitivity in the 
area. This coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. 
This result is consistent with the intuition in that environmentally 
sensitive areas are more likely to find creative ways to meet demand 
for open space. On the other hand, it is unlikely that members of 
activist organizations that promote regulation such as the Sierra Club 
would desire to live on golf courses. This proxy, however, attempts 
to capture environmental attributes in the area, not the political 
climate.3  
Public, military, and semi-private courses are all negatively related 
to the probability of homes on courses (resort courses serve as the 
                                                
3 In an alternate model, we also include the proportion of county voters in favor of 
the Green Party (Ralph Nader) in the 2000 election. This measure has a correlation 
coefficient of 0.45 with the Sierra Club variable. The coefficient on the Green Party 
variable in the logit model is negative and significant, and the Sierra Club 
coefficient remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. 
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excluded group for course classification). The coefficients for private 
courses and Audubon member courses are both insignificant. County 
population per square mile and per capita personal income both have 
negative and significant coefficients, whereas the coefficient on 
housing units per square mile is positive. The negative coefficient on 
county income is seemingly counterintuitive (i.e., it appears to 
contradict the Kuznets notion of the positive relationship between 
income and the demand for environmental quality). We offer the 
explanation that many homeowners in low-income counties have a 
desire to sort themselves in exclusive neighborhoods such as golf 
communities. Thus, this result provides additional evidence that 
courses are being constructed not for recreational golf, but to meet 
other ancillary demands for environmental quality and green open 
space. We do note, however, that the level of real GDP at the time 
the course was constructed (as indicated by our variable Initial Real 
GDP per Capita) is positive and significant—indicating that as real 
income increases over time, newly built courses are more likely to 
have homes. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The first empirical analysis in this paper focuses on data that 
report the sales of golf courses from January 2000 through December 
2002. These data provide some evidence for the notion that many 
courses have recently been forced to recapitalize once home sites 
have been sold and that some golf developers enter projects knowing 
they will not cover operating expenses, but instead charge price 
premiums for home sites located on the golf course. The data 
indicate that, relative to other courses in the United States, the vast 
majority of courses sold in the relevant two years had homes on the 
course and that these courses were, on average, significantly newer 
than other courses.  
The second empirical analysis examines data on every golf course 
in the United States and, in effect, reaches the same fundamental 
conclusion as the first empirical exercise. That is, over time, golf 
courses are becoming vehicles for contractual assurance of green 
open space for homes. We believe that this fundamentally provides 
some evidence that markets are increasingly finding creative 
contracting mechanisms for satisfying demands for public goods.  
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